Introduction
Habitat conservation plans (HCPs) are currently the most controversial component of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). Some argue that HCPs undermine the purpose of the ESA by compromising species and habitat preservation for economic gain. Others counter that HCPs allow the ESA to work by avoiding prolonged political and legal conflicts over resource use. Some argue that HCPs are based on relatively weak science. Others counter that they are based on the best science available.
Some argue that HCPs allow public input into endangered species issues. Others counter that public participation is highly variable and not assured.
These debates result in part from the great variation that exists among HCPs. Taken together, along with the federal guidelines, policies, and rules that govern how HCPs are prepared and implemented, it is possible to make some tentative claims regarding how well the HCP experience fits these criteria. This paper begins with a brief history of the HCP experience, and then evaluates habitat conservation planning according to the six criteria of the Empowered Deliberative Democracy model and the six potential criticisms of the model. HCPs fit the model well in terms of empowerment criteria. They fit less well in terms of criteria related to deliberation and democratic participation. These are gross simplifications, however, 1 Figures current as of June 3, 1999. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service publishes these figures, with a table identifying HCP characteristics, at: http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/hcp/hcptable.pdf.
because HCPs vary widely on most of these criteria.. Some departures from the model can be rectified through changes in federal policy; but it is not yet clear whether any HCP is now or ever will be an exemplar of the model.
What are Habitat Conservation Plans?
HCPs are a peculiar product of the U.S. legal system. They exist solely because of the federal Endangered Species Act. In the absence of a similar law, one can not assume that HCPs would appear in other countries because individuals and organizations would lack the fundamental motivation to expend the significant time and financial resources required to complete and implement an HCP. They proliferate in the United States because, to paraphrase Don Corleone in The Godfather, the federal government makes an offer that some individuals and organizations can not refuse. While HCP participation is voluntary, some actors face little choice given existing alternatives.
The ESA is sometimes called the pit bull of environmental laws because it has extraordinary teeth, particularly in federal courts. Among other effects, lawsuits filed (or threatened) under the ESA have foreclosed economic use of public and private resources (Yaffee, 1994 (Yaffee, , 1982 , shaped urban growth patterns (Beatley, 1994) , and reoriented state and federal agency missions (Thomas, 1997a (Thomas, , 1997b . These outcomes occur because the ESA prohibits certain actions. By contrast, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is a procedural law. NEPA requires federal agencies to produce environmental impact statements that evaluate the environmental consequences of major federal activities; but NEPA does not specify whether a particular federal activity should be carried out, and it does not directly apply to nonfederal actors. The ESA actually 3 16 U.S.C. § 1532. The Section 9 prohibition on take a pplie s only to fish and w ildlife species listed by the FW S a s "enda nge re d" (i.e., at imminent r isk of extinction). It does not apply dire ctly to plant spec ies, or to spec ies listed as " thr ea tened" ( i.e., like ly to become enda nge re d in the f ore se eable future) . Yet Section 9 c ove rs plant spe cie s indir ectly be ca use plants (suc h a s old-grow th fore sts) pr ovide habita t f or wildlif e (such as spotte d owls). Spec ie s listed a s " threa te ned" are protec ted unde r Se ction 4(d) , which re quire s the FWS to pr omulgate r egula tions deemed "nec essar y a nd advisable to pr ovide f or the c onser va tion of such species." Ta king a thr eatened species is thus permissible , de pe nding upon the wor ding of the 4(d) rule for that spec ie s. Since the FW S has gr ea t discre tion unde r Sec tion 4(d), the age nc y c an wr ite a r ule f or a thr ea tened spec ies that is a s str ingent as the pr ohibition on ta ke for endanger ed spec ies. 4 Substa ntial c ontrover sy ha s long existed over the mea ning of "harm" and w hethe r Sec tion 9 should be inte rpreted to include habita t modif ica tion on pr ivate proper ty (Rohlf, 1989:62-70) . I n 1995, the Supr eme Cour t upheld the FW S def inition of " har m" in Swee t H om e Chapte r of Communitie s for a Great O re gon v . B abbitt. or land development), and they can sue a local or state agency f or either engaging in s uch activities or per mitting them to occur. If a federal cour t rules in f avor of the plaintif f, it can pr ohibit these activities, or fine and even jail those committing the of fense. Property owners have felt sufficiently threatened by the Section 9 prohibition on take that they have attempted (unsuccessfully) to reverse the charges, claiming that the federal government is "taking" their private property without just compensation, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Pr ior to 1982, the ESA w as unyielding w ith r egard to endangered fis h and w ildlife species . As Yaffee (1982) argued, the ESA amounted to "pr ohibitive policy." O nly s cientif ic research and cons er vation activities constituted per missible take f or endangered animal species . This near-abs olute ban on take posed economic, political, and ecological pr oblems.
Economically, if one knew about the presence of an endanger ed animal species on pr ivate pr operty, the ESA essentially implied an order to ceas e activities which might cause take.
Although the F WS lacked staff to monitor s uch activities, environmentalists s tood in the wings w aiting to sue landow ners and developers for s uch inf ringements , and to s ue local and state agencies for per mitting such activities to occur .
Politically, the pr ohibition on take was a time bomb becaus e the ESA lacked a release mechanism to allow limited economic activity to occur within the habitat of a lis ted species . For this r eas on, economic interes ts lobbied hard to keep s pecies off the list, w hich necessarily politicized the listing proces s.
5 Environmentalists also picked their f ights carefully. They did not petition to lis t every species for which data supported a listing; instead, they typically focus ed on char ismatic species , w hich limited the ability of pr operty rights advocates to fr ame endanger ed species is sues as pitting " rats against people" or " bugs against jobs ."
Ecologically, the absolute pr ohibition on take was als o not entirely sensible.
Endangered s pecies suf fered -and continue to s uf fer -fr om the cumulative impacts of many activities, not s imply the few activities someone happens to notice. Therefor e, many ecologists argued that it w ould be more ef fective to pres er ve a species' habitat over the long run by acquiring pr operty and adopting for mal land use restrictions than blocking bulldozers at each s ite or punishing individuals after habitat has been altered, perhaps irreparably. I n other w or ds, it w ould make more sense to develop and implement a plan to pres er ve habitat than to track individual activities eating away at the habitat on a s ite-by-s ite, pr oject-bypr oject basis.
As the 1970s came to a clos e, economic, political, and ecological interests dovetailed when a novel idea emer ged to preserve butter fly habitat near S an Fr ancis co. This led to the f ir st habitat cons ervation plan, but it could not be implemented until
Congres s amended the ESA to author ize the FWS to iss ue a new kind of per mit w hich allowed take. The logic was s imple. The developer would be allow ed to take butterf lies by building on part of the mountain becaus e ecologis ts endor sed the HCP as a means for pr otecting s uf ficient habitat to maintain viable populations of both species. I n other words , economic development w ould be allowed to des troy some of the habitat because cr edible ecologists believed the HCP w ould preserve s uff icient habitat to guar antee the long-ter m survival of both butterf ly species .
6
When Congres s amended the ESA in 1982, new language was ins erted into Section 10 author izing the FWS to iss ue permits to nonf ederal actor s if they submit a s atisf actor y HCP. Taking endangered animal species f or economic pur pos es was no longer prohibited absolutely. Take was now permitted if it w as "incidental to, and not the purpos e of, the carr ying out of an other wis e law ful activity." 7 H ence, the coveted permit is know n as an "incidental take permit." The 1982 amendments establis hed common gr ound between economic and environmental inter es ts by allowing incidental take during the course of economic activities , w hile cr eating a mechanism to compel actors (other than feder al agencies) to pres er ve habitat for the long-term s urvival of endangered s pecies. In other 6 As Be atley ( 1994:58) has noted, the biologica l study unde rgirding the HCP w as "subjec te d to a pe er re view pr oce ss by note d conse rva tion biologists, inc luding Paul Ehr lich, w hic h ser ve d to enha nce the cr edibility of the f indings." For a dditional ba ckground on this f ir st HCP, se e Mar sh and Thor nton (1987) . On the role of conse nsual e cologica l knowledge, pa rticula rly c onser vation biology, in habita t manage me nt and pla nning, see Thomas (1997a Thomas ( , 1997b words, Section 10 r efr amed endangered s pecies debates from "species vers us jobs" to "s pecies and jobs," ther eby providing a legal mechanis m to avoid political impass es.
Each HCP mus t meet sever al basic conditions for applicant(s ) to receive an incidental take per mit. Specifically, it mus t provide detailed information on the likely impacts r esulting f rom the pr oposed take; measures the applicant will undertake to monitor, minimize, and mitigate s uch impacts; available funding to undertake s uch meas ur es; pr ocedures to deal with unf or eseen circums tances; alternative actions the applicant cons idered that w ould not r es ult in take, and the reas ons w hy such alter natives ar e not being utilized; and any additional measures the FWS r equir es as necess ary or appropriate f or purposes of the plan ( FWS & N MFS , 1996:3-10 (Yaffee, 1998:1-1) . If the prohibition on take is not enforced by the FWS or citizen suits, then applicants have no incentive to prepare HCPs. When an HCP is completed, and the permit is issued, it becomes a binding contract providing certainty to applicants.
While the "no surprises" policy is politically expedient, it is ecologically unsound and limits public participation after a permit is issued. Adaptive management is more sensible because ecological knowledge and information are fluid. As we learn more about species and their habitat requirements, HCPs should be revisited and redesigned (Noss, et al., 1997) . After all, the ESA's purpose is to prevent extinctions. If new knowledge or information suggest that an HCP does not ensure a species' survival, then the HCP should be adapted to new circumstances, or the permit withdrawn. Adaptive management would also provide an opportunity for public participation and continued deliberation after incidental take permits have been issued.
Implementation evaluations should also be part of the adaptive management process (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) . If those receiving a permit are not complying with the terms of an HCP, then the FWS and environmental watchdogs should know this is the case, so they can decide whether and how to enforce the law. If the institutional design of an HCP proves to be less than ecologically sound, then it should be redesigned to ensure the survival of the species. If the applicants are unwilling to comply or redesign an HCP, then the public should know this is occurring and have access to the process. In sum, we need to evaluate the legal, ecological, and political aspects of HCP implementation to understand how well an HCP is performing, and incorporate these findings into an adaptive management framework.
Do HCPs Fit the Empowered Deliberative Democracy Model?
The previous section provided an overview of habitat conservation planning in the United States. This section evaluates the HCP experience by the six criteria of the Empowered Deliberative Democracy model (Fung and Wright, 1999:27-30) . Given that HCPs vary widely on many dimensions, including these criteria, some HCPs fit the model better than others. This section also considers the federal guidelines, rules, and laws that shape HCP planning and implementation.
(i) Deliberation
"The distinctive characteristic of deliberation is that participants listen to each other's positions and generate group decisions after due consideration" (Fung and Wright, 1999:5) . Rather than simply voting or advocating preformed preferences, individuals allow their preferred strategies and solutions to evolve through collective deliberation with other participants. The key question for this criterion is: How genuinely deliberative are the actual decision-making processes?
When assessing deliberation, we should consider its temporal, numeric, and representational features. That is, how long does deliberation occur, how many actors are involved, and who do they represent? In terms of time scale, deliberation in HCPs can occur during both the planning and implementation phases. Here, I focus on the planning phase because we know little about HCP implementation. The first and only study of HCP implementation was not completed until 1999 (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) -16 years after the FWS issued the first incidental take permit to a developer on San Bruno
Mountain. Thus, we have very little evidence of the extent to which deliberation occurs after permits are issued.
During the planning phase, the numeric and representational extent of deliberation varies widely. The best evidence to support this claim is reported by a team of researchers who studied public participation in HCPs (Yaffee, et al., 1998) . Their research design included a survey of lead FWS staff for 55 large-scale HCPs (i.e., those covering thousands to millions of acres), and case studies of 14 HCPs in this sample. They found public participation varying from open, collaborative steering groups to closed-door processes in which the only opportunity for participation beyond the applicant and the FWS came during the notice-and-comment periods required under the ESA and NEPA.
While their study does not analyze deliberation per se, we can assume that notice-andcomment periods do not constitute deliberative processes because they occur after the HCP is virtually complete and the FWS is ready to issue an incidental take permit.
Hence, they emphasize disclosure of decisions already made. Moreover, NEPA does not require federal agencies to incorporate public comments into planning documents, which means the FWS need not ask applicants to consider the merits of these comments -let alone deliberate with those submitting the comments.
While the authors of this study do not use the language of deliberation, their conclusions nevertheless suggest that it sometimes does occur. For example: "In those cases where public participation resulted in substantive changes to the HCPs, public participation invariably began early in the process, and often included a committee with members of the public" (Yaffee, 1998:xv) . Yet such changes were relatively rare. Their survey of FWS staff "indicated that public participation resulted in significant substantive changes to only 3 out of 45 responding HCPs (7%)" while more than 75% of the sample reported that public participation led to "only minimal or moderate changes" (Yaffee, 1998:xv) . Future research on Empowered Deliberative Democracy should explore the causal roots of this variation.
That deliberation occurs in some cases of HCP planning is not surprising, given that HCPs result from a stalemate in the more traditional form of environmental regulation, in which actors are unable to achieve their preferred outcomes. Developers, for example, prefer to build housing tracts, but doing so is illegal if it harms an endangered species, and they would be sued by environmental watchdogs for violating the Section 9 prohibition on take. This leads them to work with local governments to roll zoning plans into an HCP, so planned development is covered by an incidental take permit. Doing so requires deliberation and/or negotiation among private and public actors, along with professional or academic ecologists, as to what percent of the remaining habitat should be preserved, where it should be preserved, and how it should be managed.
To avoid future lawsuits, applicants may request public participation early in the planning process so the completed HCP will not be challenged during implementation.
Yet public participation may still be closer to a negotiated process than to deliberation.
Indeed, the participation study analyzed the HCP process as "a negotiation" between the applicant and permitting agency (Yaffee, et al., 1998:3-2 The scope of deliberation is not driven by federal laws, rules, or guidelines. HCP guidelines instruct FWS staff to "encourage" applicants to broaden participation by including affected state and federal agencies and tribal governments, but applicants are not required to do so (FWS and NMFS, 1996:2-3) . This is only a guideline for FWS staff, not an enforceable rule for applicants. Moreover, the FWS "regards HCPs as voluntary, applicant-driven processes where the applicants decide whether and how to involve outside stakeholders" (Yaffee, et al., 1998:vi) . Hence, there is no guarantee that deliberation will occur among more than a single applicant and the FWS. Where deliberation among many actors occurs, it is driven by other factors, particularly the pattern of private land ownership and public jurisdiction. Where habitat is shared among multiple owners, agencies, and political jurisdictions, species preservation becomes a collective-action problem, in which multiple partners come together to share information and develop solutions to their common problem (Thomas, 1997b) . Hence, broad participation in HCPs is more likely where complex ownership patterns occur (Yaffee, et al., 1998:4-21) .
(
ii) Action
The key question for this criterion is: How effectively are decisions made during the planning process translated into real action? There is little systematic evidence upon which to answer this question because only one case study of HCP implementation exists (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) . Nevertheless, there are several economic and legal reasons to believe that HCPs are partially, if not fully, implemented.
Applicants prepare HCPs because they desire incidental take permits to use natural resources for economic or public purposes. This permit removes them from the shadow of the ESA's regulatory hammer. The FWS can revoke a permit if applicant(s) do not implement an HCP because implementation is a condition of the permit.
Environmental activists also sit in the wings prepared to sue under the ESA's strong provisions when they see violations. Evidence suggests that HCP implementation is occasionally monitored by the public, but rarely by members of the scientific community (Yaffee, et al, 1998:5-8) .
In addition to applicant incentives to implement HCPs, the FWS also assesses whether an HCP is likely to be implemented before issuing a permit. The ESA and federal HCP guidelines stipulate that each HCP must identify funding to implement specific provisions in the plan designed to mitigate the impacts of incidental take. 12 The FWS also requires a signed implementation agreement, in which applicants specify the organizations responsible for implementing specific parts of an HCP. In sum, financial feasibility is a condition of the permit, implementation is a condition of retaining the permit, and signed implementation agreements establish accountability if an HCP is not completely implemented.
We should not assume, however, that any HCP is or will be fully implemented..
HCPs are thick documents, containing numerous provisions, any one of which could be overlooked or found infeasible. In the Coachella Valley, HCP participants made a goodfaith effort to translate the plan into action; but, thirteen years after the FWS issued the permit, the plan was still not completely implemented (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) . For example, several parcels targeted for the preserve system remained unpurchased because the acquisition fund, which is based on a flat-rate mitigation fee levied on developers elsewhere in the Coachella Valley, proved insufficient to acquire all of the designated preserve lands due to changes in real estate prices. These parcels have not been developed; but they will remain unprotected until the mitigation fee structure in the HCP is redesigned, or some other organization (public or private) acquires the land.
In sum, there are strong incentives for those who receive incidental take permits to implement their HCPs. Unfortunately, we do not know whether any HCP has been or will be fully implemented. If we extrapolate from the only implementation study currently available, then we should assume that full implementation is not assured, even after more than a decade of continuous participation among multiple, dedicated stakeholders.
(iii) Monitoring
Monitoring is a crucial component of the Empowered Deliberative Democracy model because monitoring feeds information into (what ideally is) a continuous learning process. Monitoring provides information about how well these experiments work, which indicates whether they should be revisited and redesigned in an on-going deliberative process. In the environmental policy literature, this process of experimentation, monitoring, learning, and redesign is called "adaptive management" (Lee, 1993) .
Without monitoring mechanisms in place, there is action without experimentation.
Thus, Fung and Wright (1999:29) (Kareiva, et al., 1999) . Roughly half their sample (22 of 43 HCPs) contained "a clear description of a monitoring program," but only onesixth (7 of 43 HCPs) contained monitoring programs "sufficient for evaluating success"
(1999:40). On a more positive note, they found monitoring to be closely correlated with adaptive management in their sample. "In particular, 88% of the plans with provisions for adaptive management had clear monitoring plans, whereas less than 30% of the remainder had clear monitoring plans" (Kareiva, et al., 1999:41 Instead, they seek to protect the "missing" habitat through other institutional processes, such as local zoning, acquisition by land conservancies, and/or incorporating the habitat into a new HCP currently being developed for multiple species in the vicinity (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) .
The Coachella Valley experience tells us something intriguing about HCP implementation. Habitat conservation planning is challenging, expensive, and timeconsuming, particularly when it involves deliberation or negotiated bargaining among multiple actors. Hence, there is great inertia against reopening an HCP after the FWS issues a permit, regardless of applicant sincerity about implementing the plan. In the Coachella Valley, actors made a good-faith effort to implement the plan, discovered the plan was inadequate, and are attempting to address the plan's shortcomings through other means. All of which suggests that we should not expect to see HCPs revised after monitoring, if monitoring exists. Instead, the lingering threat that the FWS will pull an incidental take permit may lead permit holders to fix HCP weaknesses through related planning processes because actors perceive the HCP process to be very cumbersome.
13 Following several years of implementation, some individuals wondered whether the HCP protected the most important sand sources for the dunes in the preserve system. The preserve manager accordingly commissioned geological field studies, which indicated that the western Indio Hills provide as much as 95% of the dune field sand source (Barrows, 1996) . One study analyzed trace elements in sand grains (Meek and Wasklewicz, 1993; Wasklewicz and Meek, 1995) . A second study used aerial photographs from 1939 to 1992 to analyze active sand movement (Lancaster, et al., 1993) . Our subsequent analysis of remote-sensing data from Landsat satellites confirmed this finding, and pinpointed the sand source areas that require additional protection (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) . We accordingly gave HCP participants in the Coachella Valley the raw data and processed images to aid them in adaptive management.
While this is a motivating threat, it has never actually been carried out, in part because HCP implementation is not systematically monitored, and in part because FWS officials work with permittees to bring them into compliance when problems are discovered. On the positive side, the FWS recently issued a proposed addendum to HCP guidelines. 15 If approved, this addendum would lay out an adaptive management strategy, which could be required of specific HCPs if significant biological data gaps exist when the HCP is approved. For HCPs that incorporate this adaptive management strategy, the implementing agreement would state the range of possible adjustments and the circumstances under which they would be triggered. The proposed addendum also builds on current guidance for establishing monitoring programs to ensure compliance with an HCP, and calls for increased public participation in the HCP process through a variable 30-to 90-day comment period (depending on the scope of the plan). If this strategy is adopted, it will be intriguing to see how it is reconciled in practice with the "no surprises" policy, which is the antithesis of adaptive management.
(iv) Recombination
Recombination refers to mechanisms of coordination among local actors and central authorities. applicant's belief that he/she owns or manages enough of the species' habitat to determine his/her own destiny (Thomas, 1997b) . In other words, neither the ESA nor FWS regulations require coordinated action. Instead, coordination occurs where and when it does due to the desire of applicants to pool land, water, information, money, and other resources as a collective means to remove themselves from the threat of legal challenges under the ESA. Hence, horizontal coordination varies with the degree to which habitat sprawls across ownerships and jurisdictions. The more interlaced these are, the more coordination we will see, both in planning and (presumably) implementation.
The Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed Lizard HCP, for example, includes nine cities and one county, along with developers, state and federal agencies, and other actors.
Together, they designed an HCP that created a main preserve, two smaller preserves, and a fee area. In the fee area, developers could transform habitat by paying a per-acre mitigation fee of $600 to a city or county. The local governments then forwarded the fees to The Nature Conservancy, which pooled the money to purchase preserve lands designated in the HCP. Developers and local government officials enthusiastically endorsed this fee-payment system because it greatly reduced the burden of complying with the ESA (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) . In this case, local jurisdictions and developers created a novel means for addressing the common problem they confronted on lands they owned or managed. Ecologists meanwhile provided input on the design of the preserve system for the targeted species -the Coachella Valley Fringe-Toed Lizard.
This was the second HCP; and, like the first HCP on San Bruno Mountain, the innovations were locally developed and subsequently spread to other areas. One of the principal architects of the Coachella Valley HCP -Paul Selzer, a local attorney initially 11485-11490, March 9, 1999. hired by one of the developers -has since built a career by diffusing HCP innovations to other areas, including the Clark County HCP for the desert tortoise near Las Vegas. Secretary Bruce Babbitt and his legal staff also roam the country, spreading ideas and encouraging local actors to undertake HCPs through centrally administered incentives such as the "no surprises" policy.
(v) Schools of Democracy
"For deliberative democracy to work in real-world settings with ordinary people, it must be able to involve individuals with relatively little experience or skills in the practices of democratic deliberation" (Fung and Wright, 1999:30 No one has studied this question in the context of HCPs. Yaffee, et al. (1998) provide indirect evidence in their study of public participation during the planning process, but we currently lack direct evidence of whether HCPs enhance the deliberative skills of participants. Nevertheless, the public participation study is telling because the data and case study analyses suggest that public participation varies widely, and that some participants consider the planning process to promote negotiation and bargaining, rather than deliberation. Hence, we should wonder just how many people are learning deliberation in these schools of democracy.
Moreover, if one casually reviews the list of participants for HCPs with relatively broad participation, the participants appear to be highly educated and occupy important decision-making positions in society. They are not "ordinary" people. With regard to the planning phase, scientists -particularly conservation biologists, who study the causal mechanisms of species extinction -have not been entirely pleased with HCPs. As a group, scientists have criticized the scientific standards and limited data underlying HCPs (Kareiva, et al., 1999) . NCCP is essentially a metaHCP, or aggregation of similar HCPs, because the FWS issues incidental take permits to subregional NCCP plans. In 1993, the NCCP scientific review panel was disbanded over conflicts between scientific guidelines and planning details. As two conservation biologists who served on this review panel later stated in their book,
The Science of Conservation Planning (Noss, et al., 1997:58) : "Local implementation of these guidelines and fulfillment of the research agenda have been troublesome, but nevertheless, they represent a rare conscious and formal attempt to integrate science into the decision-making process.." Such statements should make us wonder whether and to what extent HCPs benefit targeted species, given that conservation biology has much to say about the appropriate design of habitat preserves (Noss and Cooperr ider, 1994) .
Some environmental interest groups have criticized HCP outcomes. The National Wildlife Federation funded the critical participation study described earlier (Yaffee, et al, 1998) due to concerns about limited public participation. Defenders of Wildlife has also published a critical study of HCPs, giving similar attention to public participation, but also concerned with the absence of an explicit legal mandate for HCPs to promote the recovery of species (Hood, 1998) . The Nature Conservancy, on the other hand, regularly provides financial and technical support to HCPs around the country. At the local level, some environmental groups also criticize HCPs, while others express enthusiasm.
This variation among environmental interest groups can be explained in two Some argue that the traditional alternative to HCPs -strict prohibition of takehas also been unsuccessful in recovering species (Rohlf, 1991) . For evidence, one need only glance at the short list of species which have been removed from the endangered list because their populations recovered. Whether HCPs help species more than the strict prohibition on take, however, is unknown. Logically, one might presume that no take is better than some take; but prohibition does not necessarily prevent take, while HCPs channel take in ways that (presumably) preserve habitat integrity. This remains a rhetorical debate, with thin evidence to sway neutral minds. In the meantime, Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt has recently moved forcefully to downlist species, as a symbolic effort to demonstrate that the ESA actually brings species back from the brink of extinction.
In sum, litigation is necessary to provide the fundamental incentive for applicants to develop HCPs, but that does not mean that litigation alone leads to socially preferred outcomes. Thus, it is not clear whether HCPs improve upon the traditional commandand-control implementation of the ESA in terms of species protection. HCPs likely provide a better opportunity for citizens to participate in a deliberative process, but there is great variation in the extent of deliberation. Flexibility has also allowed some HCPs to be highly innovative -including developing fee systems to finance habitat preserves and designing plans that enhance positive externalities. Hence, every HCP has the potential to be a unique, innovative experiment in Empowered Deliberative Democracy.
Criticisms of the Empowered Deliberative Democracy Model, as Viewed from the HCP Experience
This section evaluates HCPs by the six potential criticisms of Empowered Deliberative Democracy (Fung and Wright, 1999:31-37) , the first of which considers whether HCPs may evolve into forums for domination rather deliberation.
(i) Deliberation into Domination
One of the intriguing characteristics of HCPs is that the ESA levels the playing field by making actors relatively dependent upon one another. The desire for certainty among permit applicants is so strong that they actively seek to work with others who can help them create this certainty by warding off potential lawsuits over resource use. This mutual dependence increases the willingness of applicants to share information and resources, and decreases their potential dominance within deliberative arenas. One might argue that the moral character of HCPs is undermined by implicit or explicit threats to sue, but these threats bring actors to the table for long periods of time.
In the Coachella Valley, for example, a single individual brought developers to the table by threatening legal enforcement of the ESA -even though he possessed no obvious political, financial, or legal resources of his own, either to pressure the FWS to enforce the ESA or to mount a successful lawsuit. The mere threat of enforcement, which could halt development in the valley, was sufficient to bring developers to the table.
Thus, the ESA leveled the playing field, on which developers would seemingly have the upper hand with millions of dollars in assets at stake. After deliberation began, The Nature Conservancy stepped in as a neutral partner, providing technical expertise in conservation biology (for designing the preserve system) and real estate transactions (for acquiring the property).
Unfortunately, this dynamic only applies within the deliberative arena, which can be relatively small and elitist. For most HCPs, participants are not typically ordinary citizens. They tend to be highly educated and informed. Few ordinary citizens understand how the ESA works, or have time to devote themselves to a lengthy planning and implementation process. Thus, one might argue that the deliberative arena itself dominates over other parts of society. This concern may be assuaged where representation is broad, but single-applicant HCPs should give us pause to reflect, particularly when there is no public participation before the NEPA comment period or during implementation. In these cases, HCPs may be mechanisms for newly empowered applicants to pursue diluted preferences; they may not be experiments in deliberative democracy. HCPs indeed empower single applicants, but it would be hard to claim that single applicants deliberate in a democratic way, if they deliberate with anyone at all. To the extent that their use of natural resources perpetuates negative externalities for society, then HCPs might be considered a means for continued domination by the economically privileged.
(ii) Forum Shopping and External Power
Some HCP participants forum shop during the planning process. One might even argue that all permit applicants forum shop: that they initiate and complete HCPs because they believe they can achieve better outcomes through this process than through the ESA's otherwise prohibitive regulatory framework. As a corollary, one might also hypothesize that those HCPs which collapse during the planning process fail because applicants pull out when the expected value of participating in other forums exceeds that for the HCP. This represents a strong view of self-interested behavior, but it likely applies to some applicants. If it did not apply to some applicants, then we do not need the "no surprises" policy to keep them at the table.
Environmental groups similarly press their advantage outside the deliberative process when they become dissatisfied with HCPs. This usually means filing a lawsuit or whipping up a public relations frenzy against an HCP. In Southern California, Dan Silver has become notorious in this regard, particularly with NCCP. Silver directs the Endangered Habitats League, a small nonprofit representing dues-paying environmental groups. His reputation for leading HCP/NCCP participants to believe he is part of the deliberative process, and then to press his advantage outside the deliberative arena when dissatisfied with impending outcomes, extends beyond the HCPs in which he participates.
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In sum, HCPs likely exist due to forum shopping by applicants, while forum shopping by environmental activists has the potential to undermine HCPs. This is probably a good thing. After all, forum shopping by environmentalists provides a lingering threat that keeps applicants at the discussion table and prompts them to implement HCPs in a responsible manner. Since the threat of lawsuits gives applicants the basic incentive to develop HCPs, forum shopping by environmental activists before, during, and after planning is always a possibility. Forum shopping appears to be inherent in the process. 16 Silver focuses primarily on HCPs associated with Natural Communities Conservation Planning (NCCP), but his reputation extends further than his geographically isolated participation. In the Coachella Valley, a representative of the Building Industry Association (BIA) pointed to Silver as an example of destructive forum shopping -even though Silver and NCCP operated an hour or more to the west (Thomas and Schweik, 1999) . Silver justifies such forum shopping by claiming that it provides clout within these planning processes (Yaffee, et al., 1998:xvi, note 16 ). Yet forum shopping during the planning process pushes HCPs towards traditional power-based bargaining, and away from deliberation.
(iii) Rent Seeking vs. Public Goods
Unlike forum shopping, it is difficult to put a positive spin on rent seeking. If deliberative experiments fall prey to rent seeking and capture by especially well-informed or interested parties, then empowerment becomes a means for self-aggrandizement. This is a common critique of HCPs, particularly single-applicant HCPs. According to this critique, the FWS allows applicants to pursue economic gain at the cost of species and habitat preservation, while requiring minimal mitigation measures to limit threats to species and habitat.
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Certainly, we should assume that HCP applicants attempt to better their position.
Since HCPs are voluntary, applicants would not bother to prepare HCPs unless they believed that preparing and implementing an HCP was to their advantage. Yet the crucial question here is whether applicants -particularly single applicants -pursue or achieve outcomes that are primarily beneficial to themselves, while providing few (if any)
positive externalities for society. In deliberative HCPs, participants design a preserve system for species with other social benefits in mind, such as where to zone open space and how to manage growth. In doing so, they also develop social capital, including skills for deliberative practice. When HCPs are prepared by single applicants, consideration of these positive externalities falls by the wayside. They become incidental to the HCP, rather than an integral part of it.
This problem can be addressed by requiring broader participation, transparency, and accountability. Broader participation leads to wider discussion of positive and negative externalities. Transparency allows observers to monitor HCP planning and implementation, and thereby to hold applicants accountable for rent-seeking behavior.
Unfortunately, broad participation is currently only encouraged by federal HCP guidelines; and the FWS and Interior Department have done little to make the process transparent to the public. Anyone who has tried to find copies of HCPs, incidental take permits, and implementation agreements -whether in draft or final form -understands how far the system is from public transparency. A web-based library would be ideal; but, for now, simply creating a library would be a big improvement. Given the current role of centralized institutions, participation and transparency are problematic, which means that rent seeking is always a possibility.
(iv) Balkanization of Politics
At first glance, one might presume that HCPs necessarily Balkanize politics by focusing on a narrow issue (one or more endangered species) and limited geographic space (some or all of the habitat of these species). Indeed, some HCPs cover less than an acre, which suggests extreme Balkanization. Yet other HCPs cover more than a million acres, with the Wisconsin Statewide HCP for the Karner Blue Butterfly (which is nearing completion) topping out at 9 million acres. Again, the key point to consider is variation.
While some HCPs may Balkanize the political arena through narrow scope and limited public participation, other HCPs clearly aggregate issues and factions. The potential for aggregation depends on the relationship between habitat boundaries, private boundaries, and political and administrative jurisdictions. As previously noted, the larger the habitat, and the more fragmented the boundaries of private parcels and public jurisdictions, the greater the potential for aggregation. The ESA does not mandate coordinated action, but the logic of cooperation is compelling.
One might still argue that HCPs Balkanize politics by focusing only on endangered species. Superficially, this is correct. Yet the desire for an incidental take permit among applicants is so great that HCPs often become the focal document for general planning purposes, particularly in urban areas, where habitat is directly affected by numerous (sub)urban issues, including physical infrastructure, pollution, open space, development patterns, and transportation. Thus, HCPs have become the focal planning document in many urban areas as local actors fold zoning ordinances, development fees, and general plans into HCPs. This has certainly been the case with NCCP, which covers a planning area of 6000 square-miles in Southern California and 59 local jurisdictions. In the Pacific Northwest, the latest salmon listings will likely further the trend towards aggregation because future HCPs will have to incorporate the waterways through the cities, as well as the land-based activities that affect salmon, such as urban runoff, agriculture, and logging. Thus, the potential for issue aggregation is potentially great.
Even with respect to endangered species per se, Balkanization is a moot issue because there never existed a "Yugoslavia" of habitat conservation planning. Thus, HCPs have not fragmented and factionalized something that was previously unified. Prior to HCPs, the closest thing to habitat conservation plans were -and still are -recovery plans. Under Section 4 of the ESA, the FWS is mandated to prepare recovery plans for all listed species. These plans are supposed to identify the management responsibilities of agencies and other actors with jurisdiction over listed species. Yet, the mandate to prepare recovery plans is not absolute, and the FWS failed to prepare recovery plans for 45% of listed species through 1992 (Smith, Moote, and Schwalbe, 1993:1051) .
Moreover, recovery plans are merely advisory documents, not binding agreements like HCPs. Thus, there was nothing to Balkanize through empowerment.
To the contrary, HCPs arguably aggregate preservation efforts in certain situations. As previously noted, species preservation is a collective-action problem when habitat is shared among multiple owners, agencies, and political jurisdictions. Rather than preparing individual HCPs, applicants can lower their transaction costs by sharing information, pooling resources, and developing integrated solutions to the common problem they face. Though federal regulations do not require applicants to plan for a species' entire habitat or to coordinate with others when preparing an HCP, the FWS nevertheless encourages them to do so. This occurred with NCCP in Southern California, where FWS staff made it know n that anyone choosing to develop their ow n H CP outs ide the NCCP process would have to demons tr ate that their plan was compatible with subr egional NCCP plans ( Thomas, 1997b) . With the NCCP planning area covering 6000 square-miles , this incentive clear ly aggregated, rather than Balkanized, participation.
Nevertheless, it is true that most HCPs focus on a narrow issue (species preservation) and a narrow geographic area (some or all of a species' habitat). Positive externalities may result from HCPs, and some HCPs cover large areas; but the planning process itself is relatively focused, particularly when public participation is limited. For single-applicant HCPs, Balkanization may indeed be a problem; but we will not know to what extent it occurs until researchers specifically study this issue.
(v) Apathy
Citizen apathy is a serious problem for HCPs because planning and implementation occur over many years -even decades. For most individuals, this is an unbearable commitment, unless it is part of their job description. Therefore, most HCP participants represent specific organizations, such as local planning agencies, state and federal agencies, environmental nonprofits, and private firms. "Ordinary" citizens rarely participate for sustained periods. This is not a critique of public apathy per se, which is indeed a problem for the Empowered Deliberative Democracy model; rather, it is a realistic assessment of the extraordinary time demands required to produce an HCP, particularly a multi-actor HCP -regardless of whether the HCP is ever implemented, monitored, or redesigned.
Effective participation also requires significant knowledge and information about habitat requirements, organizational planning processes, and deliberative skills. This is a relatively minor issue because participants can learn these things during the lengthy planning process. They need not begin deliberation with specific knowledge, information, and skills. They must, however, be willing and able to learn as they participate. Again, this requires an extraordinary commitment, one seldom found among ordinary citizens. If the Empowered Deliberative Democracy model requires participation by ordinary citizens, then HCPs will never become exemplars of the model without funding to support citizen participation. Such funding could come from the federal government, or it could be required of applicants as a condition of the incidental take permit. Both scenarios are unlikely, however, given that current FWS guidelines only encourage participation, but do not require it.
(vi) Stability and Sustainability
The exponential growth in HCPs (cited early in this paper) suggests they are stable and sustainable. If this paper had been written in the 1980s, we might have wondered about future trends. Having been written in 1999, the current trend clearly suggests continued proliferation of HCPs in both number and geographic extent. The pool of potential applicants will remain large so long as the FWS continues to list species, which seems likely given that listing decisions must be based primarily on biological (rather than political) criteria. If human use of natural resources continues unabated, HCPs will likely thrive as the preferred means for nonfederal actors to comply with the ESA's prohibition on take, particularly if the federal government continues to provide applicants with specific assurances, such as the "no surprises" policy.
The important question is whether HCPs will thrive as experiments in Empowered Deliberative Democracy. As previous sections of this paper suggest, great variation among HCPs exists in how well they fit the model's six criteria. Deliberation and monitoring are particularly problematic, though the FWS is addressing the latter through a proposed addendum to the HCP guidelines. Forum shopping, rent seeking, and apathy also pose problems for some HCPs. In light of these shortcomings, we should consider alternative institutional arrangements to enhance habitat conservation planning, so that HCPs better approximate experiments in Empowered Deliberative Democracy.
Suggested Reforms
Some analyze how well they work during implementation. A much more ambitious reform would be to terminate the "no surprises" policy. Doing so would encourage adaptive management by permit holders, but it would likely reduce the number and scope of
HCPs. In the current political climate, more HCPs are preferred to well-designed HCPs, so this reform may not be feasible.
The most challenging problem for HCPs is deliberation. Even if federal HCP guidelines, rules, or laws mandate increased public participation, more deliberation will not necessarily result. As the quote from one participant in the Balcones Canyonlands HCP suggested, the HCP process may institutionalize bargaining and compromise rather than deliberation. Indeed, centralized directives can not mandate deliberation per se. If participants view habitat as a zero-sum pie, then they will likely fight over how much of their piece of the pie must be preserved rather than consumed, which means the standard pluralist model of bargaining and compromise will prevail. From a scientific perspective, however, this is the wrong view. Information and knowledge about the relationship between species and their habitats is constantly changing. Hence, the habitat pie is not fixed. Viewing it as fixed is to ignore the evolving nature of scientific knowledge and the accumulated information gleaned from monitoring programs. This is why adaptive management is crucial to environmental policy applications of the Empowered Deliberative Democracy model. If HCPs are framed in terms of adaptive management, then monitoring, evaluation, learning, and redesign can occur.
Since learning implies that individual preferences and strategies are not stable, deliberation entails willingness and ability to learn. The fundamental weakness of the "no surprises" policy is that it sacrifices long-term adaptive management and deliberation for short-term bargaining and compromise. In a world of limited regulatory surprises, the habitat pie is relatively constant and participants grind out rational-comprehensive plans.
Even a devoted pluralist like Charles Lindblom (1959) understood that rationalcomprehensive plans are technically infeasible. Yet, forty years later, such plans are still being promoted under the "no surprises" banner. Admittedly, fewer actors will participate in HCPs without the "no surprises" guarantee. Yet those who do participate will be much more likely to do so in a deliberative manner.
Finally, it should be noted that HCPs and traditional enforcement of the prohibition on take are not the only conceivable alternatives for protecting endangered species. While they are the two alternatives recently practiced, other possibilities for regulatory reform exist, none of which have been considered in this paper. For example, community-based watershed organizations are rapidly spreading throughout the country, and they routinely employ deliberative decision-making processes (Thomas, 1999; Moseley, 1999) . While they focus on many issues, community-based watershed organizations do not necessarily focus on endangered species or habitat conservation, so
